Singer’s Utilitarian Defense of Ethical Vegetarianism
Perhaps the most publicly vocal philosopher in favor of vegetarianism (and veganism) is Peter Singer. Singer, a utilitarian, once stated that he is a vegetarian in virtue of his utilitarian views.[1] Utilitarianism is the view that the best moral action to perform is the one that maximizes net utility, net pleasure over pain, all things considered. Thus, if animals are due moral consideration, they are to be included in the utilitarian calculus about choosing one’s diet. Singer, of course, thinks that animals are due moral consideration, that is, the underlying principle that grounds human equality should be extended to include equal moral consideration for all animals.[2]
According to utilitarianism, the moral consideration of animals corresponds with animals’ experiences of pleasure and pain. Due to the treatment of animals farmed for food, it seems largely clear that this treatment is not morally best. In other words, the morally best option is at least vegetarianism (but probably veganism, or “flexible veganism). But as Singer points out, condemning these practices might not entail the endorsement of a vegetarian diet.[3] So, Singer’s strategy is to argue that the ways in which condemning meat-farming practices might not entail a vegetarian diet, are wrong.
First, one might think revising our meat-farming practices can undermine the possible moral requirement of vegetarianism. But Singer thinks that even if such revisions were made, there is a significant “danger of our sliding back into the methods of treating animals in use today.”[4] That is, any morally important change to our utilitarian calculus will inevitably be reversed over time in returning to our old practices. So, presumably one cannot use this route for severing the connection between condemning our present meat-farming practices and the demand of vegetarianism.
Second, we do not appear to have any actual idea if the utilitarian calculations work out all things considered. That is, while the pain produced by meat-farming practices is obvious, we do not know whether this “is enough to outweigh both the pleasures people get from eating animals and the disruption that abolishing factory farming would cause to the lives of those dependent on raising animals for food.” Singer thinks, however, that these calculations are mostly worked out already. In Animal Liberation, Singer discusses in detail the pain that animals experience under our typical farming methods[5] and the likely trivial changes in pleasure between eating meat and switching to a vegetarian diet.[6] What has not been addressed is “the loss of utility to people involved in raising animals likely to result from our all becoming vegetarians.”[7] But Singer thinks that these losses can be far outweighed by the reduction of meat-eating in the western world. Redirecting food for animals to “hungry and malnourished humans who cannot afford to pay the prices paid for these crops by factory farmers,”[8] vegetarianism’s health benefits, and a reduction of animal waste altogether, the utilitarian calculations will likely produce an endorsement of vegetarianism.
The third and final way condemning animal farming practices might not entail vegetarianism is that there is no utilitarian connection between abolishing factory farming and an obligation to becoming vegetarians. Singer tries to establish this connection in various ways. I will only prevent one, that vegetarianism establishes a more legitimate platform to condemn the exploitation of animals.[9] For example, an animal rights lobbyist may have some success in progressing animal rights but can also be taken far less seriously when not adhering to a vegetarian diet. Thus, a vegetarian diet better serves the purposes of condemning our meat-farming practices, and subsequently should adopt a vegetarian diet.
A Virtue Ethics Stance on Vegetarianism
Other arguments, however, argue for vegetarianism in different ways. Due to the space limitations of this paper, I will only briefly mention two others: virtue ethics and rights-based accounts. Those that argue from virtue ethics typically think that utilitarian (and rights-based) arguments are not sufficient for establishing an obligation to adopt vegetarianism. For instance, Rosalind Hursthouse thinks that adopting a vegetarian diet is something a virtuous person would do. Given the factory farming practices as they are, Hursthouse asks if we can deny that these practices are callous and cruel, or that eating meat strictly for our pleasure (not needing meat) is greedy or self-indulgent.[10] The response is that we cannot deny these claims. The literature on the suffering inflicted on animals in factory farming practices are irreconcilable with practicing the virtue of compassion. The same is true with the literature on living healthy lifestyles without meat consumption, or not needing to eat meat.
It is true, then, that practicing the virtues would ultimately lead to adopting a vegetarian diet. By extension, the same may also perhaps apply to adopting a vegan lifestyle. Hursthouse makes mention, however, of instances where politeness and consideration may perhaps permit one eat meat dishes from well-meaning, but meat-eating friends. That is, at least until most or all of one’s friends are eventually aware their vegetarian habits. So, as Hurstshouse suggests, virtue ethics can be the grounds for reaching “roughly the same practical conclusions” as utilitarian arguments for vegetarianism.[11] It is also bears similarities to Cora Diamond’s argument on the matter, who claims that, roughly, respect for animals is due and we should not eat animals because a virtuous person would not do so, just as a virtuous person would not eat a human corpse.[12]
Regan’s Rights-Based Account and Vegetarianism
Still, others employ a different strategy, such as grounding vegetarianism in some account of rights. Tom Regan uses this strategy, first assuming that “all humans possess an equal natural right to life.”[13] This natural equal right to life is possessed by humans because “the life of every human being has ‘intrinsic worth,’” or inherent value.[14] Inherent value is grounded in the satisfaction of desires, the pursuit of interests, which add value to one’s life, and such satisfaction is equally good among all humans.[15] According to Regan, all beings that are experiencing subjects of a life possess inherent value.[16] Despite the fact that this approach will adequately account for all humans, a natural consequence is that it will also include animals. Many non-human animals are also experiencing subjects of a life, i.e., they have interests, the satisfaction of which bring value to their lives. Since those with inherent value have a right to be treated in ways that respect that value, any experiencing subject of a life has a negative right to not be harmed; harming these rightsholders would disrespect their inherent value. Factory farming, however, does not respect the inherent value of animals, i.e., they wrongly deprive animals from pursuing their interests, the same reason why killing humans is wrong. There may be ways in which rights to life may be overridden, but overall, the equal natural right to life of animals entails that factory farming is morally wrong, given the significant harms imposed on animals. Of course, people are not purchasing experiencing subjects of a life at the grocery when they purchase lifeless meat. But by purchasing and eating animals (or other animals-based products), one is actively participating in a practice that systematically exploits and violates the rights of animals. So, purchasing and eating animals (and other animals-based products) is also morally wrong.
Some Defenses of Meat-Eating
Arguments for adopting vegetarian or vegan diets can take a variety of different routes. As has been shown, while some use utilitarian considerations, others have used virtue ethics or rights-based approaches. The fact that many differing ethics approaches have provided strong arguments that conclude similar things, that we ought to adopt ethical vegetarianism or veganism, many view this large consensus as a strong mark in favor of such diets and lifestyles. But there are others that, despite a significant consensus on the issue, provide arguments for the permissibility of eating meat. The permissibility of eating meat, however, should be qualified in one of two ways before discussing specific arguments. The permissibility of eating meat could take the form of the strong claim that it is always permissible to eat meat. Virtually no one in the ethics literature on the topic hold this strong claim. Instead, many hold the weaker claim that it is at least sometimes permissible to eat meat. But this may possibly be held by many ethical vegetarians when there are exceptional circumstances, say a survival situation. Thus, many of the arguments for the moral permissibility of eating meat are understood as holding the weaker claim in otherwise normal, or non-exceptional, circumstances. It is to these arguments I know turn.
Arguments for vegetarianism, especially pertaining to factory farming, are charged with not taking conclusions to their necessary ends. Donald Bruckner holds that the force of even basic arguments for vegetarianism[17] depend on the premise that “it is wrong (knowingly) to cause, or support practices that cause, extensive, unnecessary harm to animals.”[18] Presumably, this is supposed to lead to a vegetarian diet. But Bruckner thinks that vegetarianism is one of two conclusions one can make in condemning factory farming. That is, there is an alternative to eating a completely plant-based diet, eating roadkill. There is no harm caused in picking up and processing road killed meat for consumption, “perfectly nutritious meat.”[19] Considering the massive quantity of roadkill reported from automobile accidents, such meat would provide a significant supply of meat products. Some vegetarians agree that such practices are permissible, that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with merely eating meat as such.
Bruckner goes further, though, and holds that the argument not only entails that eating roadkill is permissible, but that it is morally required. Crop agriculture results in the deaths of significant amounts of rabbits, field mice, birds, etc. While there is debate as to whether factory farming or crop agriculture causes more harm to animals, harvesting roadkill causes no harm to animals. Therefore, according the previously mentioned premise of extensive, unnecessary harm to animals, factory farming arguments entail “an obligation not to be strict vegetarians but to eat some roadkill.”[20]Arguments that appeal to environmental harm, will similarly lead to the same conclusion. That is, “collecting roadkill likely produces less CO2 than vegetable farming.”[21] The same is true of other gases and chemical compounds used in both factory farming and vegetable farming. Therefore, both arguments lead to an obligation to consume some roadkill and reject strict vegetarianism.
Earlier I mentioned that virtually no ethicists hold the strong claim that eating meat is always permissible. Timothy Hsiao, however, comes close. Because Hsiao does not think animals are due moral consideration, stronger claims about meat eating can be made. First, why are animals not granted moral status? Hsiao’s reason is that animals lack rational agency.[22] None of what has been claimed argues that animals do not experience pain or that such pain is not bad. Hsiao holds that animal pain is in fact bad, but not in any morally important way. The pain inflicted on animals for meat consumption is justified because of two important reasons: i) our nutritional interest in eating meat “is a moral welfare interest,” and ii) the superiority of moral over non-moral welfare interests.[23] So, since animals do have welfare interests, they are not moral, and as humans, our moral welfare interests take priority. Thus, in rejecting the moral status of animals, Hsiao’s view entails a critique of both utilitarian and rights-based arguments for vegetarianism.
Hsiao has a separate argument, however, that is problematic for arguments appealing to virtues. That is, factory farming practices no doubt cause harm to animals. But does inducing harm entail a wrong? Hursthouse thinks yes, such harm is a form of cruelty, while Hsiao is suspicious of harm entailing a wrong. Since Hsiao thinks animals lack moral status, factory farming might be cruel if “it is through harming animals that persons are wronged.”[24] So, in our western world where dogs are seen as human companions, treating dogs as factory farms treat livestock would be cruel. For pets are granted “the role of an honorary family member.”[25] Cruelty here is derived from significant harm done to a member of the family unit. But the same would not be true in cultures where dogs are not granted this role. Similarly, livestock in factory farms are also not granted this role. So, the industrial farming of non-pet animals (cows, pigs, chickens, etc.) is not cruel, for it does not wrong humans, but contributes to our welfare.
References
Bruckner, D. W. 2015. “Strict Vegetarianism is Immoral,” in The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat, Ben Bramble and Bob Fischer (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press.
Diamond, C. 1978. “Eating Meat and Eating People,” Philosophy, 53(206): 465-479.
Hsiao, T. 2015. “In Defense of Eating Meat,” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 28(2): 277–291.
Hsiao, T. 2017. “Industrial Farming is Not Cruel to Animals,” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 30(1): 37–54.
Hursthouse, R. 2006. “Applying Virtue Ethics to Our Treatment of the Other Animals,” in The Practice of Virtue, J. Welchman (ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
Rachels, J. 2004. “The Basic Argument for Vegetarianism,” in Food for Thought: The Debate over Eating Meat, Steve F. Sapontzis (ed.), Amherst: Prometheus Books.
Regan, T. 1975. “The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 5(2): 181- 214.
Regan, T. 1985. “The Case for Animal Rights.”
Singer, P. 1974. “All Animals Are Equal,” Philosophical Exchange, 5(1): 103-116.
Singer, P. 1977. Animal Liberation, New York: Harper Collins.
Singer, P. 1980. “Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 9(4): 325-337.
[1] Singer (1980) “Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism”
[2] Singer (1974) “All Animals are Equal”
[3] Singer (1980: 330-331)
[4] Ibid., 331
[5] Singer (1974) especially chapter 3.
[6] Singer (1974) especially chapter 4.
[7] Singer (1980: 333)
[8] Ibid., 333-334
[9] Ibid., 334-337
[10] Hursthouse (2006) “Applying Virtue Ethics to Our Treatment of the Other Animals”
[11] Ibid., 143
[12] Diamond (1978) “Eating Meat and Eating People”
[13] Regan (1975: 205) “The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism”
[14] Ibid., 206
[15] Ibid., 208
[16] Regan (1985)
[17] For examples, see Singer (1977) Animal Liberation and Rachels (2004) “The Basic Argument for Vegetarianism”
[18] Bruckner (2015: 31) “Strict Vegetarianism is Immoral”
[19] Ibid., 34
[20] Ibid., 36
[21] Ibid., 39
[22] Hsiao (2015: 279-280) “In Defense of Eating Meat”
[23] Ibid., 280
[24] Hsiao (2017: 49) ““Industrial Farming is Not Cruel to Animals”
[25] Ibid., 50
Dallas Havens 