There is not any one well-accepted and particularly clear conception of liberal neutrality due to the claims that competing accounts of neutrality make. What can be said is that liberal neutrality holds that the state should not promote any particular conception of the good, i.e., the state should be neutral with respect to conceptions of the good. Endorsement of liberal neutrality stemmed from the continued acceptance and recognition of pluralism and reasonable disagreement within society.[1] In other words, the wide range of conceptions of the good are viewed as tenable positions. The state, then, should be neutral towards these conceptions because the state will govern persons supporting just as many views about well-being as there are conceptions of the good. I will present one specific argument for this later.
Subsequently, the lack of consensus mentioned earlier is not regarding that the state should be neutral towards conceptions of the good; instead, the discussion is about in what sense the state should be neutral. Three distinctions, then, posit different senses in which the state should remain neutral about conceptions of the good: regarding the state’s goals (neutrality of aim), outcomes (neutrality of effect), or procedures (neutrality of justification).[2] Neutrality of effect, however, is not a position held by any defenders of liberal neutrality so far as I can tell.[3] Because of this, I will not address the details of this view, only that neutrality of effect holds that the state must refrain from any action that has as an effect the promotion of any particular conception of the good over others.
On one hand, neutrality of aim holds that the state “must not aim at advantaging or disadvantaging any particular conception of the good.”[4] On the other hand, neutrality of justification holds that any legislation (or other political activities) of the state should be justified without appealing to any particular conception of the good. In exploring these two senses of neutrality, it is contended that they are actually inconsistent since the “state must be neutral only between permissible conceptions of the good.”[5] Roughly, it is argued that the state should aim at disadvantaging impermissible conceptions of the good (e.g., eugenics), since such conceptions would not be consistent with principles of justice that are neutrally justified. So, despite the fact that neutrality of aim and neutrality of justification “may be contingently compatible from time to time, then, they will often conflict.”[6] In light of this, neutrality of justification is viewed as the correct sense of liberal neutrality by many. For the purposes of this paper, any mention of liberal neutrality will only refer to neutrality of justification, unless indicated otherwise.
In Favor of Neutrality
Liberal neutrality is famously found at work within Rawls’ Theory of Justice. Rawls does not argue that the principles of justice must be established in a way such that the principles are devoid of any ideas of good. Some ideas of good are allowed, “so long as they belong to a reasonable political conception of justice,” or “are shared by citizens and do not depend on any comprehensive doctrine.”[7] Effectively, these ideas are formalized to reflect political virtues and not virtues that pertain to other non-political areas of life. Rawls mentions the virtues of toleration and mutual trust as an example in which the state would be justified in disadvantaging certain impermissible conceptions of the good.
A more contemporary defense of liberal neutrality is advanced by Steven Lecce. Lecce expresses democratic equality as a “relational rather than a distributive ideal.”[8] So, if we accept that the state ought to promote equal relations between persons, then we should accept “a democratic politics tempered by contractually generated principles of justice.”[9] The fact of pluralism (about conceptions of the good) along with the ideal of equal respect will then discount contentious ethical principles and conceptions of the good. The idea here is that those contentious principles or conceptions can be reasonably rejected. But since contentious conceptions of the good can be reasonably rejected, we also ought to reject perfectionist principles because of “their (dubious) epistemic status.”[10] The same cannot be said for Lecce’s contractualism, and defense of neutrality, since “epistemology plays no role in the contractual derivation of reasonable principles.”[11] Thus, uncontroversial principles cannot be reasonably rejected, rather they can be seen as a common ground, or mutual consensus, for principles of justice.[12] In short, reasonableness and pluralism about conceptions of the good will ultimately lead to accepting liberal neutrality.
Against Neutrality
Despite the rivalry between perfectionism and liberal neutrality, there are many other non-neutralist positions one can occupy. Given that much of the critical discussion of neutrality does stem from perfectionist standpoints, I will only address two of those perfectionist arguments. George Sher lists four ways to ground neutralism: “the value of autonomy, respect for autonomy, the dangers of a nonneutral state, and skepticism about the good.”[13]
Arguments grounding neutralism in respect for autonomy are said to hold (i) that “each person must be treated as a rational agent, capable of shaping his own destiny,” and (ii) that (i) is violated when the state acts non-neutrally.[14] Thus, arguments of this type must show that autonomy actually is violated even if the state publicizes various options (of the good) and their merits.[15]
According to Sher, the works of Rawls and Dworkin have the greatest chance of showing this, consequently grounding neutrality with respect for autonomy. After thoroughly evaluating each of their arguments, however, Sher concludes that neither succeed. Since the strongest arguments for this way of grounding neutralism fail to establish a plausible respect for autonomy constraint, neutralism will need to be grounded in another way.
In evaluating the dangers of a non-neutral state as grounds for neutrality, Sher holds that we must determine “whether neutrality is the most promising way of preventing oppression, instability, or error.”[16] In preventing oppression, liberal neutralists would likely appeal to liberal rights for protection. But, as Sher points out, such rights do not and cannot make the state neutral. For a state’s neutral treatment of the good, if it is truly neutral for all state actions, “a scheme of rights would have to be so extensive as to prevent the state from functioning at all.”[17] Sher argues that this is the case because liberal rights “standardly rule out certain ways in which governments or individuals might treat (other) people.”[18] Thus, rights cannot be overridden “for any reason unless certain conditions are met.”[19] What this means is that in order for a state to truly be nonneutral, that state is prohibited from treating people in certain ways for any nonneutral reason. But this is tantamount to developing a scheme of rights that “block all the laws and policies that [the state] might enact on nonneutral grounds.”[20] Given the degree of protection against nonneutrality, a truly neutral state would be rendered useless, or at least paralyzed.
To prevent instability, liberalism must hold that members of society will be aware of the facts that the neutral justification of the principles of justice is supported by the implicit ideas in public culture, and that “our own basic political framework conforms [emphasis mine] to those neutrally justified principles.”[21] Sher argues, however, that this awareness is tantamount to inchoately accepting the fundamental components of Rawls’ theory of justice. Despite offering no alternative positive way to prevent instability, Sher thinks that the implausibility of accepting a common basic political structure fails to establish the necessary support for neutrality’s prevention of instability.
The final concern, that the state may unintentionally promote an erroneous conception of the good, is presumably resolved if the state is neutral towards any conception of the good. Sher contends that this is too strong for addressing concerns about error and a more reasonable principle yields more promising results for avoiding error and promoting greater freedom of intellectual expression. This more reasonable principle “permits us to base political decisions only on conceptions of the good that we have critically scrutinized.”[22] Such a principle results in more accessible inquiry for both the state and its citizens, hence its close ties with freedom of intellectual expression.
Sher’s admits that these dangers are genuine concerns for any state, but he also holds that neutralism is not the only successful way to address those concerns. Various other methods of avoiding these dangers leave plenty of room for a nonneutral state. Comparatively, the state’s actions to “strengthen the national defense or improve economic productivity,” is on a par with similar actions that provide “support of excellence, virtue, or the good.”[23] Thus, neutrality is not necessary or sufficient for addressing concerns of autonomy or the risks of oppression, instability, or error.
References
Arneson, R., 2003, “Liberal Neutrality on the Good: An Autopsy,” in Perfectionism and Neutrality, S. Wall and G. Klosko (eds.), Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Larmore, C. 1987. Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lecce, S. 2008. Against Perfectionism: Defending Liberal Neutrality, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Rawls, J. 1993. Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press.
Scanlon, T.M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sher, G. 1997. Beyond Neutrality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[1] Larmore (1987: 40-68) Patterns of Moral Complexity
[2] See Larmore (1987: 44) for these three original distinctions. A more formalized distinction using the terms in parentheses can be found in Arneson (2003: 193) “Liberal Neutrality on the Good: An Autopsy” or Lecce (2008: 235) Against Perfectionism: Defending Liberal Neutrality. There is also literature that uses the terms consequential (for effects), intentional (for aims), and justificatory for the three senses of neutrality.
[3] Richard Arneson also concludes as much in Arneson (2003: 193) but adds that Joseph Raz holds “that neutrality should incorporate neutrality of effect,” despite Raz being a critic of liberal neutrality.
[4] Lecce (2008: 235)
[5] Ibid., 237
[6] Ibid.
[7] Rawls (1993: 194) Political Liberalism
[8] Lecce (2008: 228)
[9] Ibid., 229
[10] Ibid., 230
[11] Ibid.
[12] This draws on the work of at least Rawls and Scanlon. See Rawls (1993) esp. Lecture V, 173-211, and Scanlon (1998) What We Owe to Each Other esp. Ch. 5, 189-247.
[13] Sher (1997) Beyond Neutrality
[14] Ibid., 72
[15] Ibid., 73
[16] Ibid., 108
[17] Ibid., 114
[18] Ibid., 115
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., 124
[22] Ibid., 138
[23] Ibid., 139
Dallas Havens 